

Trade in America 36.

C O O L
T H O U G H T S

O N T H E
Consequences of American
Independence, &c.

[Price 1s.]

1780



C O O L
T H O U G H T S

ON THE
Consequences to GREAT BRITAIN of
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE.

ON THE
Expence of GREAT BRITAIN in the
Settlement and Defence of the AMERI-
CAN COLONIES.

ON THE
Value and Importance of the AMERICAN
COLONIES and the WEST INDIES to the
BRITISH EMPIRE.

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C O O L

T H O U G H T S

ON THE

Consequences of American
Independence.

THE Independence of America has been long since recommended, by a learned and ingenious Author*, as *beneficial to Great Britain*. The plausibility of his arguments has made some proselytes. It has even produced a motion in the House of Commons to that end. Whether the boldness; or novelty of the sentiment; has been mistaken for truth, I shall not determine. However, this is certain, that at the first view of a proposition *to dismember from a state 3,000,000 of its subjects, and the far greater part of its territory*, Reason takes the alarm, and creates in the mind strong suspicions that it cannot be

* The Dean of Gloucester.

well founded : And as it involves questions of the greatest moment to the safety of the empire, it ought to be impartially discussed. I mean therefore, unbiaſſed by party views or party heat, briefly to review it, and, like the author, to ſubmit my ſentiments to the candid deciſion of the Public.

The advocates for this opinion muſt maintain, That the ſtrength of ſociety does not conſiſt in the number of its *confederated individuals*, or in the *meaſure of its wealth* :

That a ſociety of *two* is naturally and effectually as ſtrong as one of *four* millions of people ; that neither the *number* or *wealth* of its ſubjects adds to the power of a ſtate :

That an extent of territory is not neceſſary to the ſubſiſtence of a large ſociety of people ; that neither *territory* or *individuals* are conducive to the purpoſes of commerce ;

And that the powers in Europe, miſtaken in their policy, have not obtained
any

any addition of strength by the settlement of Colonies.

These are positions so contrary to the universal opinion and practice of nations, so contrary to truth and fact, that if we did not know that the generality of mankind is more remarkable for superficial inquiries than deep researches into the nature and principles of things, we should be surprised to find an examination of them necessary.

Had the advocates for American Independence looked into the nature of civil society, and those principles upon which its strength and safety are founded ; had they considered the motives which have induced nations to colonize, the benefits which arise to a state from an increase of territory and of the numbers of its members, with the diffusive advantages of commerce ; or had they reflected on the peculiar circumstances of Great Britain, an island surrounded by ambitious and powerful neighbours, and whose safety solely depends on its naval

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force,

force, the idea must have been suppressed as soon as it arose.

The design of civil societies is the safety of mankind. Disunited among themselves, they found it not in a state of nature. The weak became a prey to the strong, and the man of strength generally found one yet more powerful. Hence arose the necessity of civil society, which is nothing more than a *confederacy of many individuals, for their mutual defence.*

The design of this confederacy was not confined to defence against the lawless among themselves; it had another object equally important. Men were obliged, from local circumstances, to form different societies. And here again the weaker became liable to the ambition and conquest of the more powerful. Hence a competition for power and strength took place, as the *only means of their security.*

Reason taught them wherein this strength consisted. They saw that two men were
stronger

stronger than one, and three millions than two, and of course, that the capacity of resistance in a society depended on an increase in the number of its confederates; and that in proportion to their numbers, an extent of territory was necessary to their subsistence. They further saw, that many of the individuals of society were unfit for war: That some were necessary to cultivate the earth, while others defended their country: That it was just that those who fought their battles should be maintained and paid by the public; and therefore that wealth was one of the ingredients which composed the strength of every society.

Experience further convinced them, that in a country which did not contain mines of gold and silver, wealth was only to be acquired by commerce: That the articles of commerce could only be obtained from the earth by the industry of individuals: That therefore more territory was necessary to the strength of an empire, than what was merely sufficient for the subsistence of the society: That trade must be less, but could not be more than what the land and labour

labour of the country would produce: That the commerce of a nation must consequently be limited by the extent of the territory. I speak of that commerce which a society can command *within itself, independent of others*; because that which rests on the pleasure and will of another ought not to be, and indeed never yet was, the first object of a wise nation.

That if the articles of exportation, raised and manufactured in a country, do not exceed the value of those it requires from abroad, no increase of wealth can possibly be obtained. If the articles exported are less than those imported, that wealth which it has must leave it; the nation must become poor, and incapable to raise the supplies necessary for its defence in time of war.

From these principles they drew these conclusive truths, That a nation which possessed the most extensive territory, consisted of the greatest number of subjects, and maintained the greatest portion of commerce, must be the *richest* and most *powerful*,

ful, and consequently the *safest* from foreign danger. Hence arose a competition for territory; the great parent of numbers, wealth and power, and constant object of their wars.

Towards the end of the 15th century, the powers of Europe were, in general, poor. They contented themselves with the necessaries, without the luxuries of life. Their resources were small. Their countries produced no gold or silver, and their trade was too limited to afford any considerable supply. Commerce was monopolized by the *Genoese* and *Venetians*. They had, moreover, for a long succession of years, harassed each other in their contests for dominion, without gaining any important superiority. The discovery of a new world beyond the Atlantic, uncultivated, almost uninhabited, and altogether defenceless, gave to their policy a different pursuit, while it retained the same objects in view. They saw that by colonising they could extend their dominions, and obtain an increase of subjects, commerce, and

and wealth, at a less expence of blood and treasure, than by their wars at home.

It is the interest and duty of all states to watch the increasing strength of their neighbours, and to make use of every just measure to enlarge their own, in the same or greater proportion. The Court of *Spain*, under whose authority the discovery of America was made, first began to colonize. The other powers saw the wealth and strength which she must acquire by her colonies. Her success in the settlement of *Mexico* and *Peru*, and the vast treasures she imported from thence, induced Portugal, England, France, &c. to follow the example; and if they did not find countries containing mines of gold and silver, they obtained others, better calculated for population, immensely fertile, and capable of producing almost all the articles of commerce which, at all times, would command those metals. In these countries they settled colonies, increased their number of subjects, and extended their commerce. In short, their commerce grew in proportion

to the increase of their numbers, their wealth in proportion to their commerce, and the capacity of the national force in proportion to their wealth. The Venetians and Genoese no longer were able, by their superior naval strength, to engross the trade of Turkey and the Indies ; and the Powers colonizing, having thus rose from a state of poverty and weakness to that of opulence and strength, nearly in the same proportion, were enabled to maintain a balance among themselves, and to preserve their respective sovereignties and independence among nations.

It is impossible for a person who is acquainted with the commercial history of Europe, and will trace the progressive rise of the different societies from poverty to opulence, and from weakness to strength, not to acknowledge these truths, or not to see what must have been the fate of this island, had not the wisdom of our ancestors promoted the settlement of colonies, and acquired foreign dominions. The power of *France* and *Spain* would have been constantly growing to their present

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magnitude

magnitude and importance, and would even have exceeded what it is at present. *France*, in particular, would have been in possession of all *North America*, the *East* and *West Indies*. The numbers of her people—the extent of her dominions—her resources of commerce and wealth—and her naval power, would have been immensely increased, while those of Great Britain must, at least, have remained nearly in the state they were in two hundred years ago; and if her sovereignty, as an independent state, should have been maintained, she would now be no more than a *dwarf* among NATIONS, dependent on the will and power of others for her existence.

Indeed it is impossible to say where the consequences might have ended, had Great Britain suffered the neighbouring States to extend their dominions by the settlement of colonies, without pursuing the same policy. The universal monarchy of Europe has been long the favourite object of French ambition. Attempts to obtain it have been repeatedly made. Great Britain, by the strength derived, in a great measure, from her

her plantations, has been enabled to frustrate them. Had these plantations been in the possession of France, with the advantages arising from their commerce, wealth, and naval force, it is not an improbable conjecture, that she would have succeeded in her design ; nor is it less probable, that should France and America hereafter have it in their power to establish an offensive and defensive alliance, however the former may have hitherto failed in her grand scheme of universal monarchy, this connection may, at some future, and not very distant period, enable her to accomplish it. Such treaties will naturally coincide with their several views and interests, as soon as American Independence shall be acknowledged by the powers in Europe. America will naturally wish, while she is rising from her infant state into opulence and power, to cover her dominions under the protection of France ; and France will find new resources of strength in American commerce, armies, and naval force.

The recovery of America from the disasters and distresses of war, will be rapid

and sudden. Very unlike an old country, whose population is full, and whose cultivation, commerce, and strength, have arrived at their height, the multiplication of her numbers, and the increase of her power, will surpass all expectation. If her sudden growth has already exceeded the most sanguine ideas, it is certain, that the increase of her strength, when supported and assisted by *France*, and pushed forward by the powerful motives arising from her separate interest, her own preservation, and the prospect of her own rising glory and importance among nations, will far outrun any idea we have had of her late population.

Nor will it be the interest of America to check the ambition of *France*, while confined to Europe. Her distance, and the safety arising from it, will render her regardless of the fate of nations on this side of the Atlantic, as soon as her own strength shall be established. The prosperity or ruin of kingdoms, from whose power she can have nothing to fear, and whose assistance she can never want, will be matters of

equal indifference. She can wish for no other connection with Europe, than that of commerce; and this will be better secured in the hands of an ally, than in those with whom she holds no other connection; so that it will be of little moment to her, whether *Great Britain*, *Spain*, *Holland*, *Germany*, or *Russia*, shall be ruled by one or more monarchs. From these considerations, her interference to destroy the balance of power in Europe, and to promote the scheme of universal monarchy in her ally, is rather to be expected, than to support the one or to check the other. Should this be the case, it is impossible to foresee how far the ruinous effects of *Bourbon* ambition may be extended in Europe.

And there can be no doubt, but the views of ambition, and a desire to extend their dominions, will equally prevail in the confederated colonies. The mines of gold and silver, in South America, will be objects of irresistible temptation. Assisted by the power of *France*, or even without it, they will be able, in no great space of time, to reduce the *Brazils*, *Mexico*, *Chili*, and *Peru*, and to acquire universal domination

nion over all America. However conjectural these researches into futurity may be, they are far from being unnatural; and although they are delivered with that diffidence which becomes a person looking into future events, which may be defeated by a variety of accidental and unforeseen causes, yet I cannot help thinking they deserve, at the present conjuncture, the serious consideration not only of *Great Britain*, but of the other Powers in Europe.

By a comparison of the value of our foreign and Colonial trade, the consequences of a separation between Great Britain and her Colonies will appear yet more evident.

The whole value of the foreign exports from Great Britain, has been estimated at - - - £ 7,000,000

In 1766, the exports to North America amounted to - - - £ 3,370,900

To the West Indies *, to 1,041,199

 4,412,099

* The exports from Scotland and Ireland are not included in this article, which, no doubt, were proportionably considerable.

Thus

Thus we find that the trade with North America alone is nearly equal to one-half, and when that of the West Indies is added, to nine-fourteenths of the whole foreign commerce of Great Britain.

The exports to North America from England only, have been found, within the last thirty years, to have more than doubled in every ten years.

In 1748, they amounted	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
to - - -	830,243	16	9
In 1758, to - -	1,832,948	13	10
In 1771, to - -	4,586,882	19	9

Hence we may conclude, had not the rebellion prevented, that they would, in the next year, 1780, have amounted to upwards of 7,000,000 *l.* which is more than the value of our whole foreign commerce; and in the course of twenty years more, supposing that they should increase in a much less proportion, they would vastly exceed the whole present commerce of Great Britain, foreign as well as Colonial; and when added to the foreign exports, would produce a
source

source of wealth, more diffusive and beneficial than that of any country hitherto known.

The foreign trade of all countries ever was, and must be, fluctuating and precarious. We have formerly seen a balance of 500,000 *l.* annually returned in our trade with Turkey; but this trade has been so affected by the intrigues of *France*, and other accidental circumstances, that it is difficult to say on which side the balance prevails. The trade to Portugal was lately a favourite and profitable one; insomuch that we have not only defended it, but Portugal itself, with our fleets and armies; and yet that court, forgetting the protection it has received, and regardless of its treaties with Great Britain, has erected tribunals and companies inconsistent with those treaties, under which the British merchants have been defrauded of their capitals, and our commerce with that country is languishing into decay. Innumerable instances might be adduced to shew the uncertainty and fluctuating nature of commerce, depending upon the caprice and pleasure

pleasure of a foreign state ; but these will suffice to prove, that nations are not bound by the obligations of gratitude ; that there are no ties held sacred between them which are not founded in interest ; and that no treaties are longer binding than that interest prevails. The factions, or change in the circumstances of a foreign country, whether real or imaginary, the intrigues of our enemies, the jealousy and unprovoked enmity of our allies, the death of a king, or change of a minister, are so many circumstances upon which the security of our foreign trade must ever depend. Any one of them may suddenly blast it. The direct reverse is true in respect to our Colonial or Plantation trade. It depends not on the changes or caprice of foreign councils, nor upon the intrigues of our enemies, nor upon the alteration of the circumstances of a country. It is *our own*, nor can it be wrested from us but by arms. It is maintained against foreign invasion by our power, and secured by the laws and political ties of our own society, founded on the mutual benefit of both countries, and the united advantage of the whole empire.

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The carriage of our Plantation trade is also our own. It is made in our own bottoms, which are built by our own carpenters, and navigated by our own mariners, and consequently forms many nurseries of seamen for the support of our navy. But our foreign carriage must be divided between us and the countries with which we trade. If they admit our vessels into their ports, we must return the civility, or lose the commerce.

No human ties are so binding as those founded in interest. These will unite with our regulations in securing the plantation trade to this country. Great Britain, from a variety of circumstances, can manufacture and supply America to much greater advantage than America can manufacture for herself; and America, in every respect, is calculated to raise and furnish Great Britain with those raw materials which are necessary to carry on, to extent and perfection, those manufactures.

The Plantations, before the commencement of the rebellion, took off nearly as much

much of the manufactures of this kingdom as all the world besides ; and their consumption will constantly increase, in proportion to the number of their people and to their wealth ; nor will they, while dependent on Great Britain, ever be able to manufacture for themselves. Until the country is fully settled, land becomes dear, and labour cheap, it will be impossible. Men will expend their money and labour in that branch of business which is most profitable ; and while the man of property can make a greater annual profit, and the labourer can receive greater wages by cultivating the earth, they will never manufacture at a certain loss : moreover Government will, as heretofore, by judicious restrictions and reasonable encouragement, apply the labour and industry of each country to their proper and most beneficial objects.

If such are the precarious tenure of our foreign commerce, and the secure state of our Colonial, whoever, relying on the former as the means of national wealth and strength, shall surrender up the latter, will

find, in the end, that he has given up the substance, and only retained the shadow.

No arguments can more evidently shew the importance of the colonies to this country, than a comparative view of the number of our people, and of the increase of our manufactures, commerce, shipping, naval force, and customs, as they stood just before the settlement of our colonies, and of their amazing increase at present, occasioned principally, if not solely, by our Plantations.

Before the settlement of our colonies in the time of Queen Elizabeth, the people of London were only 100,000—they are now at least 700,000.—The numbers of other trading towns, we may justly suppose, are considerably increased, though perhaps not in the same proportion. The seats of our manufactures, in some instances, have increased in a much greater proportion. The class of people employed in the cultivation of the earth, and in raising subsistence, must be also increased, or the citizens and manufacturers could not find subsistence.

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We received all our naval stores from, and a great part of our ships, although they were few when compared with our present numbers, were built by, and purchased of, foreigners. It is now unlawful for us to trade in foreign bottoms ; all our ships are built at home, and no money is sent out of the kingdom to purchase them.

Our customs did not exceed 36,000 *l.*—our commerce would not yield more. In the year 1778, they amounted to 3,538,040 *l.* being doubled upwards of *ninetyfold*.

Our naval force consisted of thirty-three ships, of the smaller size ;—it is at present upwards of three hundred, and nearly one-third of them ships of the line.

Germany furnished us with almost all the materials made of iron, which were used in husbandry and architecture, even to the nails ;—we now manufacture those articles for ourselves, and supply all Europe with them. Portugal furnished us with sugars, and we received the produce of
America

America from Spain. Our West Indies send home more sugars than we can consume, and enable us to supply other nations. Paper, linen, and many other articles, we formerly had from France, which we now manufacture within ourselves; and the Venetians and Genoese retailed to us, at their own prices, all the articles of commerce from the Indies. The legal interest of money was 12 *per cent.* and the price of land only twelve years purchase. Our shipping were few—not so many as lately belonged to America alone. In short, we could not, with propriety, be called either a manufacturing or commercial people; but now, by advantages derived from innumerable sources, all rising in our colonies, we are become, in truth and fact, the first and the greatest manufacturing and commercial people on the globe.

It is impossible to place the position I am refuting in any view in which its folly and absurdity does not appear. While the colonies remained dependent and subordinate members of the empire, their people were,

to all intents and purposes, the subjects of the British state. Their labour and industry, their commerce, their fighting men and mariners were, and, had the dispute respecting the mode of raising American aids been settled upon just and constitutional principles, their purses would have been, as much within the power of the state, as those of its subjects in Great Britain. But if the political *union* between the two countries be once dissolved, all the benefits arising from three millions of subjects, all the strength from the assistance of their proportion of men when embodied in arms, from their mariners, from their aids towards the common defence in time of war, and from their labour, industry, and commerce, in time of peace, will be lost to this kingdom, and turned into a channel *never to be regained*.

The New States are, and will continue the allies of France, our natural enemy, unless reduced; and although at this time by far the *greater part* of the people wish and hope for an union with this country,
and

and are ready to unite with us in reducing the power of their tyrants, in the moment the least encouragement shall be given for that purpose, which the *infatuated policy of every commander has hitherto withheld*, yet, should they be disappointed in their hope, it will compel them to unite with the enemies of this kingdom. The mode of carrying on the war, more cruel to friends than foes, added to the inhumanity and treachery of this country, in not exerting its powers for their relief, will not fail to create permanent enmity and resentments; and the obligations of gratitude to the nation which shall save them from our ravages, will stamp impressions never to be effaced. Advantage will be taken of these dispositions, by the policy of France to establish treaties of alliance and commerce with them, which will be founded on two great principles, their own *mutual interest*, and the *subduing the power of Great Britain*; and if she should be permitted to trade with them at all, it will only be to share with other nations in the *worthless remains*, after their own and the purposes of their allies are served.

With

With the Independence of America we must give up our fisheries on the banks of Newfoundland and in the American seas. To the loss of at least 35,000 * American seamen,

* An Estimate of the Seamen employed in the American and West India Trade.

Seamen employed in ships from Great Britain to America	- - -	28,900
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Seamen employed in the trade of America, to the West Indies, France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, and coastwise from one colony to another, &c.	- - -	35,000
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Seamen employed in the trade from the West Indies to America, Africa, and Europe		20,000
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83,900

If any person shall imagine that the number of seamen employed in the trade from America and coastwise is exaggerated, let him consider, that 426 square-rigged vessels; and 370 schooners and sloops, have cleared out, in one year, from the single port of Philadelphia; a port from whence not more than one-eighth part of the produce of America is exported. He will further consider, how many are necessary to carry on the extensive coast trade of a country 1600 miles in extent, besides the inland navigation of Casco Bay, the Bay of Fundi, the rivers Providence, Connecticut, the Sound and North river, Delaware bay and river, Chesapeake bay, James's, York, Rappahannock, Potomack, Patuxent, Potapsc, Chester, Choptanck, Nanticoke, and Wecomico, Curretuck, Albemarle Sound, Ocracock, Core Sound, New River, Cape Fear, Pedee, E Sante,

seamen, we must add upwards of 28,000 more, bred and maintained in those excellent nurseries. Our valuable trade, carried on from thence with the Roman Catholic States, will be in the hands of America. These nurseries, and this trade, will ever remain the natural right of the people who shall inhabit that country. A trade so profitable, and a nursery of seamen so excellent and so necessary for the support of her naval force, will never be given up, or even divided by America, with any power whatsoever.

The *British islands* in the *West Indies* must fall of course. The same power that can compel Great Britain to yield up *America*, will compel her to give up the *West Indies*. They are evidently the immediate objects of *France*, while she looks forward

Sante, Ashley, Cooper's, Edisto, Cambahee, Coofaw, Broad River, and Savannah. The inland navigation of this country is the most extensive one in the world. Many of the above-mentioned rivers are navigable, by square-rigged vessels, upwards of 150 miles, and maintain great numbers of small craft in loading their vessels, and transporting their commodities from one place to another.

to the advantages which must accrue from these acquisitions, and the Independence of *America*, viz. the *sovereignty of the British seas, if not of GREAT BRITAIN itself*. But if *France* should fail to obtain the *West Indies* in the present war, *America* having recovered and increased her strength, confirmed her confederacy, made her people unanimous, established her navy, and settled her foreign alliances, all which she may accomplish in a few years, they must become a part of her union. Nature has planted them in her vicinity. They are as much her appendages, as the *Isle of Man* or the *Orcades* are those of *Great Britain*. Besides, the *West Indies* cannot well subsist without *America*. Their supplies of provisions must be obtained from thence; and *America* stands in equal necessity of a number of articles which are to be obtained from the *West Indies*, and no other country. In either of these cases, what must become of our manufactures? We know that we receive from these islands certain commodities, absolutely necessary to carry them on to any advantage and extent, and which we can procure from no other coun-

try. We must take the remains from France or America, after they have supplied themselves, and fulfilled their contracts with their allies, at their own prices, and loaded with the expence of foreign transportation, if we are permitted to *trade* for them at all. France has long struggled to rival us in our manufactures in vain; this will enable her to do it with effect. But should a war happen between us and those countries hereafter, where are we to obtain them? Will the provident care of our merchants lay up in time of peace, under those disadvantages, a sufficient quantity to supply the manufacturers in the long course of the war? We are not to expect it; our manufactures must in a great measure cease, and with them our trade.

But this is not all we shall lose with the West Indies. We must add to our loss of seamen, sustained by the Independence of America, at least 20,000 more, who have been bred and maintained in the trade from *Great Britain* to the *West Indies*, and in the West India trade among themselves and with other parts, amounting in the whole
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to upwards of 80,000 * ; a loss which cannot fail to affect the sensibility of every man who loves this country, and knows that its safety can only be secured by its navy.

Will not Great Britain lose much of her Independence, in the present state of Europe, while she is obliged to other countries for her naval stores ? It is not long since she was obliged to the Northern countries for those very supplies, upon which her safety depended. She had them not within her own dominions, but received them from others at their own prices. We may recollect, that, in the time of Queen Anne, we paid, at Stockholm, 3 *l.* per barrel for pitch and tar, to the extortionate Swede ; and that such was the small demand of those countries for the manufactures of this, that the balance of trade was greatly in their favour. The gold and silver, and the wealth of this nation, which we obtained in our other commerce, was continually pouring into their laps. But

* See Note, p. 25.

of late we have greatly reduced that balance, by our importation of large quantities of those supplies from America.

It has hitherto happened, that, since we have found it necessary to increase our naval force to its present extent, we have not been at war with the Northern Powers ; but how long this may be the case, the wisest man among us cannot foretell ; and I fear, no politician, who shall candidly consider the present state of Europe, will insure it for twenty years. The policy and councils of nations are changed and reversed by so great a variety of circumstances, that reason forbids a reliance on them. A wise state should guard against all accidents. We have seen Spain intimately united with Britain, and receiving her Independence from our arms ; but we now see her combined with our inveterate enemy, and in actual war against us. The House of Austria was lately rescued from ruin by the friendship and valour of Britain ; and yet, lost to all sense of gratitude, we soon after saw her united against us,
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with that very enemy from whose power she had been saved. Should a war take place between us and the Northern Powers, where are we to procure our naval stores? America produces all of them, and can yield more than sufficient for the British navy, and all the British trade. *Timber* of every kind, *iron*, *saltpetre*, *tar*, *pitch*, *turpentine*, and *hemp*, are raised and manufactured in that country. Fields of 100,000 acres of *hemp* are to be seen spontaneously growing between the *Ohio* and *Mississippi*, and of a quality little inferior to the European. Naval stores have been already imported, at a price much lower than that of the same articles from the Northern countries. Surely a wise people will readily perceive the good policy of keeping in their own hands, and at their own command, commodities which are so immediately necessary to their safety.

Should *America* be independent, and the *West Indies* be conquered by *France*, or annexed to *America*, all their produce, secured to this country by the laws of trade, because necessary to its manufactures, commerce,

merce, and naval strength, we must receive at the hands of *France* or *America*, at their own prices, and subject to the expence of foreign transportation ; or it may be stopped at their own pleasure. Such as are necessary for our manufactures, if those manufactures should exceed in quality, or vie with those of *France* or *America*, they may either prohibit their exportation to us, or sell them at such exorbitant prices, as to undersell our merchants at foreign markets. If we should make use of them in our foreign trade, unmanufactured, we must go to market under an insuperable disadvantage, loaded with a foreign price, and all the charges of foreign exportation. In time of war, *Great Britain* may be destitute of those articles that are necessary for her manufactures ; *France* and *America* may pass edicts to prohibit their exportation, or may issue them so sparingly, as to serve their friends and allies, and no more. All this will be dictated by policy ; or, if they should not be so guarded, we must take them from the neutral Powers, loaded with the additional expence of double prices and transportation, which no manufactures

factures can bear ; the necessary consequence of which must be, that the trade of Great Britain will depend on the *pleasure of her enemies.*

America independent ! the West Indies conquered by France, or annexed to America ! our fisheries on the banks of *Newfoundland*, and the *American coasts*, with all the trade of the *West Indies* and *America*, cut off from the *British* commerce ! Where are our nurseries of seamen ? Will the Coast trade, and our trade in the *Baltic* and *Mediterranean*, with the small intercourse which we have in our own bottoms with other nations, furnish seamen sufficient for a navy necessary for the protection of Great Britain and its trade ? Will the numbers of our mariners, bred and maintained in these nurseries, continue as they are at present, when our manufactures are labouring under the disadvantage of receiving their materials at higher, and exorbitant prices, and selling at foreign markets at a certain loss ? Will these nurseries of seamen, I ask, thus weakened, supply the loss of 80,000 sustained

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by the Independence of *America*, and the conquest of the *West Indies*? We wanted seamen last war, although assisted by *America* and the *West Indies*; we want them now, to fit out a fleet equal in force to that of our combined enemies. What then must be the state of our naval force, when so great a proportion of our seamen are *cut off*, and thrown into the scale of our enemies, and when the nurseries which raised them are lost for ever? The answer to this question is as evident as distressing. Our navy, the GREAT BULWARK OF OUR SAFETY, will be sunk into contempt, and the BRITISH FLAG will be no more respected in the British seas, than the *lug-sail* of an *oyster-boat*.

The forlorn and wretched state of Britain, before she relied on maritime force for her protection, is to be seen in her History. Continually plundered and ravaged, she was reduced, by foreign invaders, to the last extremity; and although her Princes soon after found that her safety depended on that force, and exerted themselves to increase it by every means in
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their power, yet in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, it did not exceed thirty-three vessels of war, of an inferior size; a force by no means equal, in number of mariners and guns, to that of the privateers fitted out in the last war by *America* alone. By what means has the strength of our navy, from that day to this, been increasing to its present amazing force? Can it be justly imputed to any other than the settlement of the Colonies, the variety and extent of our foreign commerce in consequence of it, the additional nurseries of seamen, and the great amount of wealth which has been poured into Great Britain, by the immediate and circuitous trade of *America* and the *West Indies*? And when these causes shall cease, will not their effects cease with them! The British navy shall rapidly sink into decay, while the fleets of her enemies are continually growing up to greater power!

The fatal effects of the strange position I am endeavouring to refute, do not stop here. The British navy thus weakened, and the fleets of our enemies thus

strengthened, the latter will ride triumphant in the mouths of our ports and harbours. In time of war our commerce must cease, or be quickly destroyed; and our manufacturers must starve. The isles in the British seas, and even Ireland itself, must be an easy conquest to the increased numbers and strength of our enemies; because it will be impossible for Great Britain, with an inferior and enfeebled navy, to relieve them in time of invasion; and no man of sense will assert the possibility of means by which the *East Indies* can be saved.

In short, it does not require the spirit of divination to perceive, that Great Britain, thus robbed of her foreign dominions and her commerce, her nurseries of seamen thus lost, her navy thus weakened, and the power of her ambitious neighbours thus strengthened and increased, will not be able to maintain her *Independence among nations*. For suppose, what is scarcely possible, that the people of this nation, from their present luxurious and dissipated state, should suddenly return to the hardy virtues,

virtues of their ancestors, and be thence led to make the utmost exertions for their internal defence; yet so great a *diminution* of her strength, and so great an *increase* of that of her enemies, must render her coasts and her territory liable (as in the times of the Danes and Saxons) to their incessant ravages, which must end in her CONQUEST AND SUBORDINATION TO SOME NEIGHBOURING POWER.

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ON THE

EXPENCE OF GREAT BRITAIN

IN THE

SETTLEMENT and DEFENCE of the
AMERICAN COLONIES.

MANY arguments have been urged, to render the doctrine of American Independence palatable to the people of this kingdom. Most of them are too weak to call for serious refutation; but others carry with them a degree of plausibility, which ought to be impartially examined.

It has been often asserted, “ that Great Britain has expended, in the settling and defending America, more than she will ever be able to repay;” and “ that it will be more to the profit of this kingdom to give her Independence, and to lose what we
have

have expended, than to retain her a part of its dominions."

In stating the account of American expence, she is charged with the sums expended in the support of some of the Colonial governments, with all the bounties paid on her articles of commerce imported into this kingdom, and with a great part of the expence of the last war. Now upon a candid examination of these charges, we shall find none but the first can, with any degree of justice, be carried to the account of America.

And when this is examined, what does it amount to? The sums expended have been confined to the new Colonies, settled within the last fifty years, and to New-York. *New England, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, the Delaware Counties, and Virginia*, beyond all comparison the most valuable, have not cost Great Britain a farthing. The sum expended on *New-York, the Carolinas, Georgia, Nova Scotia, East and West Florida*, amount to no more than 1,700,000 *l.* and when we deduct
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from that sum 700,000 *l.* extravagantly expended in building a *key* at *Halifax*, we can call it only 1,000,000 *l.* which, on an average, in the course of fifty years, is no more than 20,000 *l.* *per annum*; so that this sum, and no more, is really what Great Britain has paid for all the wealth received from America, and for all the other obvious benefits, arising from the industry and commerce of the Colonies, which we have carefully monopolized to ourselves.

But suppose we had expended, in the planting and governing the Colonies, twenty times as much, would it be consistent with good policy to give them up in their present circumstances? They are now arrived to a state of so much maturity, as to be able to support their own burthens, to contribute largely to the national aids, and to repay us even that twentyfold. There is scarcely any thing profitable to be acquired without previous expence. The merchant must lay out money in building a ship, purchasing a cargo, and in navigating his vessel to market, before he can

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receive

receive his returns. If he should take it into his head, just as his vessel returns laden into port, that the expence he has incurred was too great, and should therefore sink her in the Thames, or give her up as worthless, would not all men declare, that Bedlam was the most proper place for his abode ?

Were we to inquire into the amount of the expence incurred by other states in Europe in the settlement of their Colonies, we should find that none have been settled at an expence so trivial. The amazing sums expended by *Spain*, in the acquisition and settlement of *Mexico*, *Chili*, and *Peru*, and by *Portugal* in the *Brazils*, exceed all comparison. And although these Colonies do not yield to their possessors one half of those advantages which we derive from our own, yet we do not find that they are either willing to give them up, or tired of the expence ; they wisely consider them as valuable parts of their empires, necessary to their strength and safety, and therefore worthy of protection.

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As to the second charge, it is unfair and unjust. Bounties were given on the importation of some American commodities, but they were such as we wanted, and could not raise in Britain, and such as were necessary to our manufactures or naval stores. If we intended to benefit America, by drawing her attention to the raising of these articles, we also expected to obtain equal, if not greater, advantages to ourselves. If the bounties were paid, the benefit expected was received; if not, we were nothing in advance, therefore nothing ought to be charged on that score to America. In short, the benefit was reciprocal, and no more. The charge of bounties should be, in justice, erased from the account of these politicians.

In the year 1754, *France* had recovered herself from a state of weakness, occasioned by her former wars. She saw the increasing strength of *Great Britain*. Her ambition, which never sleeps longer than the want of power to exert it, resolved to reduce the growing strength of her rival. *America* was the most vulnerable part of the British dominions,

dominions, and therefore France began hostilities on the *Ohio*. Now can any man of sense believe, suppose *Great Britain* had not possessed a Colony in America, that *France*, thus recovered in strength, would not have attacked her in some other part? Can it be thought that peace would have long subsisted between the two nations, who have ever been at perpetual war? Whoever maintains this opinion, must maintain that the Sovereigns of *France*, and the principles of its national policy, were changed at that time from what it is at present, and what it has been for many centuries past. The truth is, that the great object of France was then, as it is now, to reduce, by all possible means, the national strength of her rival; and that the last war was not either merely a British or an American war, as some have called it, but a war with the *British nation*. How, then, or with what degree of justice, can the expence of the last war be charged *solely* to the account of America? Change therefore the account, and charge the expence, as justice and reason demand, to *Great Britain and America*, as the members of the same state, and take into consideration the exertions

exertions of both countries, their numbers, and wealth, and we shall find that not one-tenth part ought to be charged to the account of the Colonies.

If the odious and absurd distinction must be made between one part of the dominions of a state and another, let us do justice in the distinction we ourselves have made. To do this, we must give America credit for the number of troops sent into our armies, for all the supplies she granted, for the number of privateers she fitted out, uniting in the protection of our trade, in all the American and European seas, during the last war. But this is not all: We must also give her credit for all the benefits arising from the labour, industry, and commerce of her people, ever since her settlement to the year 1774*. When this is fairly done, I much suspect these Anti-American politicians will find themselves very unskilful in political arithmetic; and if their penetration does not lead them to see, their posterity will feel, that America

* The exports to North America from Great Britain, in the twenty-five years last preceding 1774, amounted to more than 50,000,000 l.

was not only worth all that has been expended upon her, but that a *just, firm, and constitutional* subordination of the Colonies, was absolutely necessary to the Independence and existence of Great Britain.

Indeed this mode of stating an account, and charging the benefits conferred, and not crediting the benefits received, is not only fundamentally unjust; but, to do it at all between one part of an empire and another, under the same dominion, is profoundly absurd. Should we raise an account against the *West Indies, Scotland, or Ireland*, for the sums expended in their defence, &c. &c. we should find the sum of an immense amount; and should we draw from thence the same conclusions, which the advocates for American Independence have done, that they are not worth defending, we should soon strip Great Britain of all her foreign dominions, and leave her naked and helpless.

Another argument, much relied on by the advocates for American Independence, is, that " a similarity of laws, religion, and manners, between the people of Great Britain

Britain and America, has formed an attachment which will insure to Great Britain a preference in the commerce of America." I wish to give this specious argument all the weight it can deserve, and therefore agree, that a uniformity of laws and religion, united with a subordination to the same supreme authority, in a great measure forms and fixes the national attachment. But when the cause of that attachment shall cease, the attachment must cease with it; when the laws, and the supreme authority under which they were made, shall be abolished, the manners, habits, and customs, derived from them, will soon be effaced; and when other, and different systems of laws and government shall be established in their stead, other and different habits and manners must take place. And therefore, when one part of a society shall revolt from the principal state, institute a new system of government, and having abolished their old, new laws shall be made, in conformity to the principles of their new established authority; how this similarity of manners is to be preserved, seems beyond our comprehension. The facts

facts truly are, that the Americans have already instituted governments as different from, and opposite to, the principles upon which the British Government is established, as human invention could possibly devise. New laws and regulations are already made, and will continue to be made, in conformity to, and in support of, their new political systems; and of course destructive to this national attachment. Their New States being altogether popular, their essential laws and regulations do already, and will continue to bear a greater resemblance to those of the *democratical cantons of Switzerland*, than to the laws and policy of Great Britain. Thus we find, in their first acts, the strongest of all proofs of an aversion in their rulers to our national policy, and a sure foundation laid to obliterate all affection and attachment to this country among the people. How long then can we expect that their attachment, arising from a similarity of laws, habits, and manners, if any such should remain, will continue? No longer than between the *United Provinces* and *Spain*, or the *Corficans* and *Genoese*, which was changed,

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from the moment of their separation, into a national enmity that is not worn out to this day.

As to the attachment arising from a similarity of religion, it will appear still more groundless and ridiculous when facts are considered. America has no predominant religion. There is not a religious society in Europe, which is not to be found in America. If we wish to visit the Churches of England, or the Meetings of Lutherans, Methodists, Calvinists, Presbyterians, Moravians, Menonists, Swinfielders, Dumplers, or Roman Catholics, we shall find them all in America. What a motley, or rather how many different and opposite attachments will this jumble of religions make ! It is a truth, rather to be lamented than exposed, that dislike and aversion are more commonly found between religious, than any other societies. Difference in opinion respecting a single article of faith, has been often a sufficient ground of persecution. From whence we may conclude, should there be any remains of this kind of na-

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tional attachment, that the Lutherans, Calvinists, Menonists, Swinfielders, Dumplers, and Moravians, will be attached to Germany, the country from whence they emigrated, and where their religions are best tolerated; the Presbyterians and Puritans to Ireland; and the Roman Catholics to France, Spain, and the Pope; and the small number of their Churches of England to Great Britain.

To sum up the whole weight of this argument in a few words, Do we not daily see Monarchies at war with Monarchies, Infidels with Infidels, Christians with Christians, Catholics with Catholics, and Dissenters with Dissenters? What stress, then, can be justly laid on an attachment arising from a similarity of government, laws, or religion?

It has been also asserted, " that America, when independent, will be naturally led, from motives of interest, to give the preference in trade to this country, because we can supply her with manufactures cheaper than she can raise them, or purchase

chase them from others." If America should not enter into any commercial alliances with other nations; if there should be no subsisting cause of enmity between us at the time of our separation; and if she could not manufacture for herself, it must be allowed, that her interest would lead her to take from Great Britain those particular articles with which we can supply her cheaper than other countries. But it is not probable that one of these circumstances will occur; on the contrary, it is more than probable that ^{the reverse} all of them will concur in, ^{of} preventing a trade between us. A commercial alliance is already ratified, greatly injurious to the trade of Great Britain; and should France succeed in supporting American Independence, no one can doubt but other treaties, yet more injurious, will be added; and how far they may extend, it is impossible to tell; and as to her ability to manufacture, she possesses, or can produce, a greater variety of raw materials, than any other country on the globe.

When America shall have a separate and distinct interest of her own to pursue, her views will be enlarged, her policy will be exerted to her own benefit, and her interest, instead of being united with, will become not only different from, but opposite to, that of Great Britain. She will readily perceive, that manufactures are the great foundation of commerce, that commerce is the great means of acquiring wealth, and that wealth is necessary to her own safety. With these interesting prospects before her, it is impossible to conceive that she will not exert her capacity to promote manufactures and commerce. She will see it to be clearly her interest, not only to manufacture for herself, but others. Laws will be made, granting bounties to encourage it, and duties will be laid to discourage or prohibit foreign importations. By these measures her manufactures will increase, her commerce will be extended, and, feeling the benefits of them as they rise, her industry will be exerted, until she not only shall supply her own wants, but those of Great Britain itself, with all the manufactures made

made with her own materials. Nor will this reasoning appear to be merely conjectural, to those who will consider the roving and fluctuating nature of Commerce. If we look into history, we shall there see her, at different periods, in the possession of the Phœnicians, Carthaginians, and Venetians. Germany and France lately enjoyed her, and supplied Great Britain with their manufactures. Great Britain at present folds her in its arms.

But the length of time which Great Britain shall sustain her importance among commercial nations, entirely depends on the wisdom of the present measures. If she should give up her dominion over America, her commerce, in a little time, must perish; should she retain America, nothing can deprive her of it. For, although, should the ties of interest and policy be once severed by the violence of war; passion, and resentment, which nothing but great length of time can efface, will succeed, and alliances with other nations, to the detriment of Great Britain, in the

the mean time will be made; yet should she again be united with us in the same common interest and policy, the task will not be difficult to induce her to pursue, what is most profitable to herself, the cultivation of the earth, and the raising raw materials for the manufactures of Great Britain, for ages to come. She will attend to, and pursue that business, which, under this circumstance, will most naturally and profitably contribute to the common interest of both countries. She will find that she can raise raw materials, and dispose of them to Great Britain, for greater profits than she can manufacture them, and receive in return all the necessaries and luxuries of life cheaper than she can procure them from other nations. Here her true interest will coincide with, and strengthen her political attachments, provided those attachments are formed and maintained on a broad, liberal, and just foundation: I mean, when the same measure of power shall be exercised over her people, and the same enjoyment of privileges shall be granted to them, as are exercised over, and

and enjoyed by, the subjects in Great Britain ; for it does not require much knowledge of the principles upon which all societies are founded, and of the dispositions of men, to see that nothing short of this policy can shut the door of jealousies, discontents, and separation, between the subjects of the same state.

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ON THE
VALUE AND IMPORTANCE
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American Colonies and the West Indies
to the British Empire.

SINCE the preceding sheets were printed off, the Writer has been favoured, by a friend, with an account of the exports and imports between *England* and the *West Indies*. Upon perusal of them, he naturally recollected the great clamour which has been lately made, respecting the loss of *Dominica*, *St. Vincents*, and *Grenada*, while that of *Thirteen British Colonies* seems to be thought scarcely worthy of public regret. A stranger, who will visit the *Royal Exchange*, or two certain *august Houses* in *Westminster*, and there hear the language

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and doctrines which are held, respecting these Islands and Colonies, will conclude, that the safety of the British empire depended on the recovery of the first, and that the last were of as little importance to the public weal, as so much territory, and so many subjects in the moon.

I shall not inquire into the causes of a partiality so uncommon, and of an inattention so singular, and which may, in their effects, be so dangerous. It is immaterial whether they arise from private interest, or the blindfold zeal of party. The consequences of misapprehensions in the public, relating to matters essential to their true interest, will be the same, whatever may be their origin. But I shall endeavour to combat their influence by the weapons of facts and truth, and leave the result to the disinterested and impartial.

Comparisons between one part of a society and another, when their safety is in question, are rather invidious, and to be avoided; because every part of the same

empire is equally entitled to protection. But when the comparison is made ; when it is made unjustly and on false principles ; and when it tends to divert the public attention from objects of the greatest public importance, no apology for an attempt to shew its errors can be necessary.

The truth is, that the value of these Islands, in whatever light we view them, will bear a very small proportion to that of North America. I shall, however, at present, only consider them in a commercial one. The value of the exports from England was,

In 1771,	l.	s.	d.
To North America,	4,586,882	15	5
To Dominica, £ 170,623	19	3	
To St. Vincents,	36,839	10	7
To Grenada,	123,919	4	5
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	331,382	14	3
Difference	4,255,500	1	2

These facts require no comment to prove the truth I wish to inculcate. They shew, at one view, that the Islands did not take off one-fifteenth part of that quantity of English produce, manufactures, and fo-

reign articles of trade, which are annually taken off by the American Colonies, and place the great disparity, in the proportionate value of the former to the latter, when weighed in the proper balance of importance to this country, in its true light.

I am far from intimating, that our utmost efforts ought not to be exerted for the recovery of these Islands. I know they are a valuable part of the West Indies ; and I too well know the consequence of the West Indies to the commerce of Great Britain : And yet, acquainted as I am with the superior importance of America, and how much the security of those islands depends on her union with Great Britain, I cannot help perceiving the mistake of those men, who, when they are considering the means upon which the future opulence and power of the empire depend, can lay so much stress on the safety of the West Indies, and at the same time manifestly discover not only a disposition towards, but earnestly contend for, the Independence of America. If they would put the value of all the West Indian plantations in one scale, and

and candidly weigh that of America in the other ; if they would reflect on her vast extent of improved and improveable territory, her superiority in numbers of people, of mariners, of shipping, and in naval force, with her various and extensive capabilities, many of them hitherto untried and unexplored, of raising and furnishing raw materials for the manufactures of this country, and the vast consumption of every article of our commerce, which the numbers of her people must occasion, they would discover their error, and, I hope, would find candour enough to confess that the Colonies in America are of some consequence to Great Britain, as well as the West Indies.

Erroneous opinions often arise from a deficiency in knowledge of facts, from misinformation, and sometimes from inattention to known circumstances. However, I trust opinions thus founded may be easily rectified. Incontrovertible facts must answer that end. I shall therefore briefly recite, in a comparative view, those circumstances which are peculiar to each country,
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and by which their importance to Great Britain can only be justly estimated.

1mo, The North American Colonies, exclusive of Hudson's Bay and its appendages, contain, in extent of territory, upwards of sixteen hundred miles in length, and from seven hundred to a thousand in breadth. The West Indies, were they all put together, would appear, when compared with them, but a speck on the same geographical map.

2do, The American Colonies are, in general, healthy, and, when undisturbed by war, have, and will continue to double their numbers of people, in the course of twenty-five years, by their own natural increase. The West Indies are as unhealthy as any country on the globe. They have been, and will continue, the graveyard of Europeans and Africans. To keep up their stock of inhabitants, which is necessary to their cultivation, improvement, and value, we are obliged to supply them, at a great expence, annually, with many thousands of people from the British dominions and Africa.

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3tio, With all this assistance, the West Indies do not contain more than than one-third of the number of inhabitants that are to be found in America. Five-sixths of these are negroes and slaves, who can be considered in no other light than so many intestine enemies, ever ready, on a tender of their freedom, to revolt to the first invader. These islands, therefore, have been, and ever must remain, a dead weight on this country, in its wars and struggles for its own sovereignty and safety. Instead of contributing their proportion of men, in arms, towards the common defence, they must always be defended by our fleets and armies, and at the expence of the blood of this country. The circumstances of America are very different. She has some negroes, but their whole number does not amount to one-fifth part of her people. She will ever, hereafter, be able to contribute her just proportion of troops in every war; and in every other respect to bear her proportionate share of the burdens necessary to the national defence. In the last war she raised, and sent into the field, upwards of 20,000 men, and assisted in conquering

quering the very islands about which the public solicitude, altogether inattentive to her interest and safety, is so warmly engaged.

4^{tho}. The climate and produce of the West Indies are nearly the same in all the islands. The latter is confined to a few, though valuable, articles of commerce; but America contains all the variety of climate, and soil, which is to be found in near thirty degrees of latitude, and from ten to fifteen of longitude. If the West Indies can supply us with the luxuries, and not the necessaries of life, America can furnish us with both. If the former furnishes us with *rum, sugars, cocoa, coffee, pimento, and ginger*, the latter can send us *wheat, rye, barley, oats, Indian corn, rice, flour, biscuit, salt beef, pork, bacon, venison, cod, mackarel, and other fish, and tobacco*. When our crops have failed, she has poured in her grain, and assisted us in feeding our labouring poor; and if a famine should ever happen in Great Britain, her relief will be ever at hand in America. If the West Indies produce some materials
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for dyers, viz. *logwood, fustick, mahogany,* and *indigo*; America produces *indigo, silk, flax, hemp*; *furs and skins of the bear, beaver, otter, muskrat, deer, tyger, leopard, wild cat, fox, racoon, and pot ash, pearl ash, copper and lead ore, iron in pigs and bars,* for our manufacturers; besides all the articles of naval stores, such as *timber, plank boards, masts, yards, and ships built for sale, pitch, tar, turpentine, hemp, and salt-petre.* Whatever of these articles are necessary to promote the manufactures and commerce of this country, are immediately sent home, while the surplus only is exported to the other Colonial and foreign markets; and even the proceeds of that surplus are, in a great measure, remitted in bills or cash, in payment for our manufactures, and foreign articles of commerce, used and consumed by the people of America. Thus the extensive and valuable trade of that country, in a great degree, centers in Great Britain.

5th. To these circumstances I may add a fifth, yet more important and convictive. If the West Indies have not arrived at the
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height of their value, it is certain that there is no great probability of any considerable increase in their improvement; while that of America is rising, and will continue to advance for many years to come, in a rapid progression, hitherto unknown in any country.

The value of the exports, *l.* *s.* *d.*
from England to North

America, was, in 1763, 1,867,285 6 2

In 1771, - - 4,586,882 17 11

Increase in eight years, 2,719,597 11 9

The value of the exports,
from England to the
West Indies, was, in

1763, - - 1,149,596 12 4

In 1771, - - 1,155,658 3 11

Increase, in eight years,
only - - 6,061 11 7

The value of the imports
into England from the
West Indies, was, in

1763, - - 3,268,485 14 6

In 1771, - - 2,800,583 14 0

Decrease in eight years, 467,902 0 6
I have

I have not been able to procure an account of the general exports from the West Indies, although I have taken some pains to do it, and cannot, for that reason, make a comparison between them and those of North America; I must therefore content myself with only adding the amount and increase of the latter, which were,

In 1766,	-	-	£	3,924,606	0	0
In 1773,	-	-		6,400,000	0	0
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Increase in seven years				2,475,394	0	0

I shall close these accounts with a view of the exports ~~from~~ Great Britain to foreign nations, and from England to America and the West Indies, in distinct articles, that the candid inquirer may perceive the proportion which the two last, either separate or united, bear to the former.

The exports from Great Britain to

foreign countries, have been generally computed at	-		l.	s.	d.
			7,000,000	0	0
In 1771, from					
England to					
America -	4,586,882	15	5		
To the West					
Indies -	1,155,658	3	11		
<hr/>					
			12,742,530	19	4

The exports from Scotland to America and the West Indies, we know are considerable. Could I have procured them, they would have been inserted; however, there can be no doubt, that, when added, they will increase the value of the exports to the Plantations from Great Britain, to upwards of - - - £ 6,000,000 0 0 which is nearly equal to the amount of all the foreign exports of this kingdom, and to one-half of the whole ~~foreign~~ commerce of the nation, exclusive only of that to Ireland and the East Indies.

From the preceding facts and remarks, the advocates for American Independence may perceive, that what they contend for, is nothing less than to dismember, from the British community, the *greatest part* of its territory, and more than one *fourth part* of its people, and to give up near *one half* of its commerce (the trade to Ireland and the East Indies excepted), foreign as well as Colonial;

Colonial ; which, united, must necessarily involve the decay, if not the ruin, of the best sources of wealth and strength in the possession of the empire ; more especially, as a great part of what we shall give up must fall into the hands of our natural and determined enemies. However, should these men, whether excited by private interest, or the restless spirit of ambition, or the violent rage of party, or the alluring but false charms of republican principles, or by an ill-founded enmity to our happy constitution, in their impetuous career after the different objects of their pursuit, not find time to view these fatal consequences of their conduct ; or if, seeing them, they shall remain unmoved by the alarming and dreadful prospect ; it is to be hoped, that the good sense of Britons, whose all is at stake in this critical moment, will be no longer seduced by men who, not understanding, or willingly misapprehending, the true interest of the nation, have thus inhumanly dragged it to the brink of so dangerous a precipice ; and that they will, before the opportunity shall be irrecoverably

coverably lost, avoid the distress, of all distresses the most painful, of reflecting that they have been the willing dupes and instruments of their own ruin, and of that of their country.

F I N I S.



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